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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78-
2a-3(2)(d) and (f). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue for review and standard of review: The issue on 
appeal is whether alcohol content of "0.08%" or greater by 
weight" constitutes a public offense now that the state 
enabling statute has been amended to remove the percentage 
weight standard and establish an actual measurement standard. 
The Appellate Court reviews such questions of law for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. Reeves 
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
STATUTES 
U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-43(1) 
U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-44(1) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted of driving with a "blood or 
breath alcohol content" of "0.08% or greater by weight". The 
Court denied Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment in open 
court on September 23, 1992, and entered Judgment September 30, 
1992. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
Salt Lake City's brief asks this court to exceed its 
judicial power and encroach upon a core legislative function 
reserved to the Utah Legislature. 
ARGUMENT 
THE BRIEF OF APPELLEE URGES THIS COURT TO DISREGARD THE 
ROLE OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY SALT LAKE 
CITY'S DISREGARD FOR THE ROLE OF THE UTAH LEGISLATURE. 
Effective June 5, 1987, the Utah Legislature 
substituted "concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown by 
a chemical test" for "content of .08% or greater by weight as 
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shown by a chemical test" in U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-44(1). The 
former law was stated as a percentage by weight while the 
current law sets forth an absolute gram amount by volume. 
Salt Lake City has yet to explain why it has never 
made its DUI ordinance consistent with the 1987 law, even 
though local DUI ordinances are subject to the heightened 
requirements of U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-43(1) providing that such 
ordinances "shall be consistent" with state DUI laws which 
govern the same matters. 
Instead, Salt Lake City asks this court to interpret 
the new law as not being materially different from the old 
law and asks this court to speculate that the jury might 
have based a guilty verdict solely on the part of the 
ordinance that is not materially different from the new law. 
Even though the state legislature found it necessary 
to put the new law into effect effective June 5, 1987, Salt 
Lake City takes the position that it need not comply with the 
mandate of U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-43(1), and now enlists the help of 
this court in interpreting the state law effective June 5, 
1987, out of existence. 
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Salt Lake City has exceeded its municipal power and is 
asking this court to exceed its judicial power. The 
definition of a crime is an essential legislative function 
reserved to the state legislature. In State v. Green, 793 
P.2d 912, 915, (Utah App. 1990), this court wrote: 
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Gallion, 572 
P.2d at 687, that article VI section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, which vests legislative power in the 
Utah Legislature, limits the legislature's ability 
to delegate that power to others. Reiterating 
that there are certain "essential legislative 
functions" that cannot be delegated, id. at 688, 
the Gallion court held that the "determination of 
the elements of a crime and the appropriate 
punishment therefore are, under our [Utah} 
Constitutional system, judgments, which must be 
made exclusively by the legislature." Id. at 690; 
see also State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 
(1913) (it is for the legislature, not the courts, 
to define what constitutes criminal conduct). 
The trial judge below stated that the defense had 
raised a legitimate issue over Salt lake City's failure to 
comply with the state DUI enabling law, but that it was an 
issue for the Utah Court of Appeals, not for the Salt Lake 
Department of the Third Circuit Court. 
The issue is now before the Utah Court of Appeals, and 
the reversal of one DUI conviction in order to secure 
municipal compliance with state DUI enabling law is certainly 
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preferable to compounding municipal disregard for the role of 
the state legislature with judicial interpretation that 
renders core legislative activity meaningless. 
Just as Salt Lake City's request to have the trial 
court take post-jury trial judicial notice of alleged facts in 
this criminal case was improper, so is it also improper for 
Salt Lake City to attempt to justify its own disregard for the 
role of the state legislature by asking this court to exceed 
the judicial role reserved to this court and encroach upon 
the state legislature's core role of defining a crime. 
Inexplicably, Salt Lake City's brief makes repeated 
reference to some kind of need for evidence or marshalling of 
evidence to find the meaning of the words used by the 
legislature in the new law effective June 5, 1987. This 
belies the fact that statutory language presents a question 
of law, not fact, and while evidentiary marshalling is an 
appellant's burden when challenging findings of fact, the 
argument is misplaced in a case of determining the meaning of 
words used in statute, a question of law. 
Exercising its core legislative function of defining 
a crime, the Utah Legislature changed the law from one of 
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percentage by weight to one of weight by volume. No evidence 
is needed to demonstrate what this means, but for the 
convenience of Salt Lake City, defendant has annexed hereto a 
weights and measurements chart from a Franklin Quest Ready 
Reference, in honor of Salt Lake City's recent naming of the 
Derks Field replacement. 
Under federal law, a motion to arrest judgment presents 
a pure issue of law. Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 34.02, 
Motion to Arrest Judgment, states: 
Like a Rule 29(c) motion for acquittal after a 
jury verdict of guilty, or a Rule 22 motion for 
new trial following conviction, a Rule 34 motion 
for arrest of judgment is a possible avenue for 
post-trial relief from a judgment adverse to the 
criminal defendant. Post-trial motions for new 
trials or for acquittals are based on evidentiary 
grounds, i.e., that newly discovered evidence is 
materially exculpatory or that the existing 
evidence is not sufficient, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to convict. By contrast, a Rule 34 motion 
asserts that the prior verdict, judgment, or plea 
of guilty or nolo contendere is not valid for 
reasons apart from the sufficiency of the 
evidence. The motions for arrest of judgment may 
be granted only if the verdict, judgment or plea 
of guilty or the plea of nolo contendere is 
insufficient as a matter of law for one of two 
reasons: the indictment or information does not 
charge an offense or the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the crime. 
Since Rule 34 motions for arrest of judgment 
primarily address these essentially legal, non-
factual issues the district court should properly 
determine the motion solely from a study of the 
face of the indictment and the applicable law 
without resort to the evidence adduced at trial. 
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Utah law is different than federal law. In State v. 
Larsen, 934 P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1992), this court wrote: 
An arrest of judgment is based on a finding that 
the facts proved do not constitute a public 
offense. Under common law and the federal rule, 
"a judgment can be arrested only on the basis of 
error appearing on the xface of the record1, and 
not on the basis of proof offered trial." United 
States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 281, 90 S.Ct. 2117 
2125, 26 L.Ed.2d 608 (1970). The Utah rule is not 
as limiting and requires a trial court to "arrest 
judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not 
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is 
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the 
arrest of judgment." Utah R.Crim.P. 23. The Utah 
rule allows a judge to look beyond the face of the 
record at the facts actually proved or admitted 
in determining whether the alleged conduct was 
prohibited. See Workman, 806 P.2d at 1202. But 
see State v. Owen 753 P. 2d 976, 978 (Utah App. 
1988) (suggesting Utah rule does not allow the 
trial court to go beyond the fact of the record 
to consider "proof offered or adduced at trial"). 
In this case, a single charge of DUI was stated in the 
alternative and was proven at trial. The charge did not 
constitute a public offense. Had the ultra vires language in 
the ordinance appeared in a different and unrelated section, 
the charge might survive under the analysis in State v. Sawyers 
819 P.2d 806 (Utah App. 1991): 
[3] Sawyers also contends that he was convicted 
under a statute that has been ruled 
unconstitutional. Although portions of the 
Controlled Substances Act were found to be 
unconstitutional delegations of legislative 
authority in State v. Gallion 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1977) , Sawyers was convicted under Utah Code Ann. 
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§§58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(L) and 58-37-8 (Supp.1990). 
These portions of the Act were not affected by 
Gallion and therefore have not been ruled 
unconstitutional. See State v. Green, 793 P.2d 
912 (Utah App.1990) 
Unlike State v. Sawyers, this case involves a sole 
charge stated in the alternative that did not constitute a 
public offense, and the trial court should have arrested 
judgment in this case based on Salt Lake City's disregard of 
the Utah Legislature's exercise of its core legislative role 
of defining crime. 
To hold otherwise would give license to municipalities 
throughout the state to adopt not-one-drop zero tolerance 
measures and tests not authorized by state statute and couple 
them with the generalized "incapable of safely operating" 
language that does appear in both the state statute and the 
Salt Lake City ordinance. They could then argue on appeal, as 
Salt Lake city is attempting to do, that the jury might have 
disregarded the measures and tests and convicted based on the 
generalized language. 
While this would undoubtedly be politically popular in 
a number of Utah municipalities, and might even suit the 
personal preferences of some judges on or off of this court, 
the state legislature's constitutional authority to define 
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crime would thereby be seriously, improperly, and 
unconstitutionally infringed upon, and this court should reject 
Salt Lake City's attempts to have this court so hold. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgment should be reversed. 
DATED this day o 
ROfiEBT^. COPIER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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READY REFERENCE 
WEIGHTS AND MEASUREMENTS 
Conversion Table 
To Convert Into Multiply By 
Centimeters 
Feet 
Gallons 
Grams 
Inches 
Kilograms 
Kilometers 
Liters 
« -P? 
Inches 394 
Feet 0328 
Meters 01 
Millimeters 10 
Centimeters 30 48 
Inches 12 00 
Meters 3048 
Miles 0001894 
Yards 3333 
Pints 8 0 
Liters 3 785 
Quarts 4 0 
Ounces 035 
Pounds 002 
Kilograms 001 
Centigrams 2 54 
Feet 0833 
Meters 0254 
Yards 0278 
Grams 3 000 
Ounces 35 274 
Pounds 2 205 
Feet 3281 
Meters 1000 
Miles 621 
Yards 1093 
Cups 4 226 
Pints 2113 
Gallons 264 
Milliliters 1000 
Quarts 1057 
To Convert Into Multiply By 
Meters 
Miles 
Ounces 
Pints 
Pounds 
Quarts 
Yards 
Temperature 
10 0 10 
' I I 
— I i 1 1 1 r-
10 20 32 40 50 60 
Centimeters 100 
Feet 3281 
Inches 39 37 
Kilometers 001 
Miles 0006214 
Millimeters 1000 
Yards 1093 
Feet 5280 
Yards 1760 
Kilometers 1609 
Grams 28 35 
Pounds 0625 
Kilograms 028 
Liters 473 
Quarts 50 
Gallons 0125 
Grams 453 59 
Ounces 16 0 
Kilograms 454 
Pints 2 0 
Liters 946 
Gallons 25 
Inches 36 00 
Feet 3 00 
Meters 914 
Miles 0005682 
20 30 
^ — i 
^ , • ] 
70 80 90 
Celsius = 5 /F 32\ Fahrenheit - 9C + 3 2 
9 5 
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BEADY REFERENCE 
l WEIGHT AND MEASUREMENTS I 
I Metric System 
Linear Measure 
10 Millimeters = 1 Centimeter 
10 Centimeters = 1 Decimeter 
10 Decimeters = 1 Meter 
10 Meters = 1 Dekameter 
10 Dekameters = 1 Hectometer 
10 Hectometers = 1 Kilometer 
Area Measure 
100 Sq 1 Sq 
Millimeters Centimeter 
10 000Sq 1 Sq 
Centimeters = Meter 
1 000 000 Sq 1 Sq 
Millimeters = Meter 
100 Sq Meters = 1Are(a) 
100 Ares = 1 Hectare (ha) 
100 1 Sq 
Hectares " Kilometer 
1 000 000 Sq 1 Sq 
Meters = Kilometer 
Volume Measure 
1 liter - ° °01 CUDIC 
meter 
10 milliliters = 1 centiliter 
10 centiliter = 1 deciliter 
10 deciliters = 1 liter 
10 liters = 1 dekaliter 
10deckaliters = 1 hectoliter 
10 hectoliters = 1 kilolite? 
Weight 
I 10 milligrams = 1 centigram [" 
10 centigrams = 1 decigram L 
10 decigrams = 1 gram 
10 grams = 1 dekagram 
10deckagrams = 1 hectogram 
10 hectograms = 1 kilogram 
1 000 kilograms = 1 metric ton 
I I. 
U.S. Customary System 
Linear Measure 
12 inches = 1 foot 
3 feet = 1 ya r ( j I 
51 /2 yards = 1 rod 
40 rods = 1 furlong 
8 furlongs = 1 mile 
3 land miles = 1 league 
Area Measure 
144 sq inches = 1 sq foot 
9 sq feet = 1 sq yard 
301/4 sq yards = 1 sq rod 
160 sq rods = 1 acre I 
640 acres = 1 sq mile 
1 sq mile = 1 section 
36 sections = 1 township 
Liquid Measure 
4 gills (2 cups) = 1 pint 
2 Pints = 1 quart 
4 quarts = 1 gallon 
Dry Measure 
2 pints = 1 quart 
8 quarts = 1 peck 
4 pecks = 1 bushel 
Weight I 
2711/32 grains = 1 dram 
16 drams = 1 ounce I 
16 ounces = 1 pound 
100 pounds = 1 
hundredweight 
20 hundredweight = 1 ton 
Kitchen Measurements | 
3tsp = 1 tbsp 
4tbsp = 1/4 cup 
51 /3 tbsp = 1/3 cup 
16 tbsp = 1 cup 
2 cups = 1 pint 
4 cups = 1 quart 
2 pints = 1 quart 
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ADDENDUM 
